Congo News n. 196


EDITORIAL: Towards the end of the consultations, political intrigues






EDITORIAL: Towards the end of the consultations, political intrigues


We are now reaching the end of the national consultations, and ideas and proposals are multiplying.  There are ideas circulating regarding a type of “consensual democracy” which would allow, during a time of crisis, the formation of a “consensus government” or “national union” resulting from a “new parliamentary majority” fruit, in its turn, of a “republican pact”.


“Consensual Government”: a drug without diagnosis

Given the lack of information on the work of the various thematic groups, it is not easy to understand who these ideas come from and whom they benefit. The opposition, indeed, suspects the current majority of wanting to widen its reach and the parliamentary majority, in its turn, accuses the opposition of wanting to gain power.

According to a working paper entitled ”Technical data – Phase 2 ”, the idea of a “consensual democracy” has its basis in the crisis of legitimacy following the electoral chaos of November 2011 (dispute of a majority obtained by the means of electoral fraud) and it requires a kind of “republican pact” between the country’s principal political forces. This “Republican Pact” would imply an agreement on a government programme and provisions guaranteeing the stability of the Government (certainly the reshuffle of a parliamentary majority).

If the objective is to solve the political “crisis of legitimacy” of the people that the electoral commission and the supreme court of justice declared elected in 2011, in spite of the electoral frauds, one could reach this goal only by tackling the underlying problem, that of the electoral results announced which, according to all observers’, correspond neither to the truth, nor with justice. Answering this question entails stating what has happened, fixing it if possible, and taking the necessary measures to ensure that it does not happen again. To limit itself to the creation of a new parliamentary majority, in view of a so-called government of national union, by recruiting certain opposition parties to the cause – without succeeding to gain the support of the opposition parties most affected by the electoral fraud – would be a simple political intrigue which would not contribute at all to national cohesion among voters.


“Republican Pact”: towards a new single-party system?

Concerning a potential “republican pact” for an agreement on a joint government programme, we must remember that it would be used, sometimes inevitably, when there is no clear majority in parliament and, in the current situation, it does not seem at all necessary, as the current parliamentary majority is already vast and has every opportunity to pass all the measures it deems necessary.

The risk of an even greater parliamentary majority is that it would devastate the opposition, imposing on the country a kind of single-minded approach which could lead the country to the political model of the single party in the manner of the ill-fated one-party state of the past. In addition, according to reports, supporters of consensual democracy consider that national cohesion achieved through national consultations would lead to a new political context where the consensus between the parties involved in the consultation process should prevail over the texts (legal and legislative) and the elections. According to this version of events, the formation of a national union government, as a result of the consensus, would thus require that a new electoral calendar be negotiated, which would inevitably delay the next election due in 2016.


And the issue of the occupation of eastern DRC?

Lastly, it is entirely regrettable that the question of the “political crisis” has taken precedence over another much more dramatic crisis, that of the war of aggression and occupation of the east of the country by foreign, Rwandan and Ugandan armies, thus violating national sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the country. There is a risk that the national dialogues of Kinshasa (in DR Congo) close with simple “conclusions and non-binding proposals”, while the negotiations under way in Kampala (in Uganda) between the government and the March 23 Movement (M23), an armed group supported by the Rwandan regime, will lead almost certainly to an “agreement” marked by severely restrictive decisions.

In this situation, only the men and women who are more responsible and able to rise above personal interests for the best interests of the community will be able to ensure the survival of the nation and to contribute to the return of peace.





On 12th September, the UNC, led by Vital Kamerhe, the RCD-KML, led by Mbusa Nyamwisi, the PT, led by Steve Mbikayi, the UPC, led by Thomas Lubanga and the UDEMO, led by Nzanga Mobutu, as well as certain trade-union organisations, signed the act creating the Coalition for True Dialogue (CVD). The national member of parliament Steve Mbikayi, president of the Labour Party (PT) and spokesman for the coalition, explained the meaning of their approach: “The consultations of the People’s Palace are not inclusive, in the sense that there is a large fringe of politicians from the opposition and even from the majority who boycotted them because they are poorly organised.” We will fight for true national dialogue”. He describes the national consultations as a congress of the presidential majority. In addition, Steve Mbikayi accuses the Head of the State of wanting to widen his political family and to create a new presidential majority in order to implement a single-minded approach.[1]


On 21st September, the Coalition for True Dialogue (CVD), denounced “the existence of a scheme of the division of power according to the formula 1+2, i.e. a president of the Republic and two vice-presidents”. Their spokesman, Steve Mbikayi indicates that this scheme which will be suggested to the national forum would have been decided during a secret meeting, without giving precise dates, held by a group of individuals not far from Kinshasa. In a statement made public the same day, Steve Mbikayi considers the purpose of this scheme to be “to make institutions start over”. “This new political conspiracy (…) constitutes a violation of the constitution of February 18, 2006, and in consequence its de facto repeal”, he denounced, also fearing the dissolution of the National Assembly, the Senate and the provincial Assemblies, and the introduction of a transition which puts an end to democracy”. Furthermore, the CVD notes that in the Kampala talks the Kinshasa Government and the M23 were agreed on ten points that incorporate the 5 themes currently under discussion at the ongoing national consultations at the People’s Palace. Faced with these Machiavellian manoeuvres of power, the CVD demands the immediate end of the Kampala talks, the suspension of the People’s Palace consultations, the convocation of the True Dialogue and the payment of all the files in litigation to the Kampala talks in this True Dialogue.

In response, the presidential majority (MP) has denied ‘the existence of a scheme of division of power according to the formula 1 + 2.’ MP Henry Thomas Lokondo said that “this kind of surreal scheme would seriously violate an order that the head of State had signed as the founding act of the national consultations“, he rejected the idea of a new transition in the DRC, because ‘the people are tired with the upheavals that have marred Congolese political life since the 90s” and insisted on the fact that participants in the national consultation process were aiming rather ‘to strengthen the political will regarding the application of the constitution, laws of the Republic and other decisions for better governance of the State“.[2]





On 12th September, delegates of the opposition within the thematic group ‘Disarmament, demobilisation, social reintegration, or repatriation of the national consultations’ withdrew, to protest against the absence of armed groups in these talks meant to address the causes of the war in the East of the DRC. For opponents, the presence of the representatives of armed groups at these talks is very important, as participants in the consultations do not have sufficient documentation to properly analyze the issue. They resumed their participation the next day, following the intervention of the presidium who promised to examine the possibility of the armed groups participating in the talks.[3]


On 14th September, Kyet Mutinga Marie, national coordinator of the collective of the Civil society organisations for the Culture, education and the health sectors (COSCES) which participates in the thematic group for ‘Community conflicts, peace and reconciliation’ at the national consultations, explained that “the quest for land due to population pressure, the weakness of the administration, the disputed definition of borders, the anarchistic occupation of land, the non-enforcement of judicial orders, forced and massive population movement, the support of minorities by some neighbouring countries and the involvement of the traditional authorities in the distribution of land are among the causes that we have examined this Saturday”. The 150 delegates present in this thematic group criticised the land disputes and those of the agreed protected zones. They also identified, among these conflicts, those known as ethno-political, such as identity conflicts, which are linked to the questioning of nationality and the manipulation of politicians, particularly during the election period and diplomatic and legal disputes. She also remarked that “another type of conflict evoked by this theme concerns the presence of foreigners in DRC”, such as armed groups, illegal migrants and other refugees. “Their presence is likely to cause problems tomorrow, if ever some of them manage to claim Congolese nationality for one reason or another”, she added. The principal challenges here are: “to return local communities to peaceful coexistence and community spirit, to put an end to the recurring cycles of violence which lead to the collapse and misery of local populations, to prevent as far as possible the occurrence of conflicts between communities whose causes are sidelined, to set up unifying structures for the reinforcement of national cohesion”. “The question of the current senators and provincial deputies’ mandate elected in 2006 and ending in November 2011, will soon be examined as part of the topic of political, administrative and social conflicts”, indicated Me Kyet Mutinga Marie.[4]


On 15th September, eleven Congolese armed groups from North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri demanded participation in the national consultations. Grouped in a coalition called “Supreme Council of native armed groups of eastern DRC”, they believe that the issue of insecurity in the eastern part of the country will not be resolved without the participation of their representatives. They find it “unjust” that the government agrees to discuss with M23 at Kampala but refuses to invite the national armed groups to take part in the national consultations. Before the beginning of the national consultations, the Congolese government had made it known that those armed groups that remained active, including M23, were not invited to these talks. “We will not share a table at the National consultations with people who kill our compatriots in the East of the country. Only those who have left the dissident forces to reintegrate into civilian life can be accepted if they express the desire to do so”, explained its spokesman Lambert Mende. The armed groups therefore invite the Congolese authorities to reconsider their decision “as soon as possible”.[5]


On 17th September, received by the presidium of the national consultations, the representatives of the armed groups said that their presence is essential to the national consultations. The president of the Alliance of the popular and patriotic Forces of Congo (AFPC), Jules Ziringabo, stated that the resolutions which will result from these dialogues will not be binding for the armed groups if they do not take part in these talks.[6]


On 19th September, at the time of a press conference with Kinshasa, the Congolese government spokesperson, Lambert Mende, confirmed that the government had decided to exclude active armed groups from the national consultations, even though it supports the participation of former armed group representatives, i.e. with groups that have already ceased their activity. While “the armed groups are certainly central to the issues examined during the consultations, insofar as they are the vectors of violence and insecurity in the East”, at the same time, the Congolese government thinks that they constitute “a true plague of which the DRC must be cured”. “In addition, we do not have any guarantee that consultations involving active armed group representatives would bring a definitive end to the cycle of violence in the East. If such were the case, the DRC would long ago have ceased to be a victim of rebellion. Even the integration of the rebels into the political process did not have the anticipated results”, pointed out the government spokesperson.

According to the minister, “to allow the active armed groups to take part in the consultations, would be a call to further rebellions, because their presence at the consultations could imply that the shortcut for participation in political life and a career within the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) is the taking up of arms”. “DRC’s recent history teaches us that already on several occasions, this argument (for consultation with the armed groups), at first glance tempting, gave rise to a most disagreeable antecedent: namely the formalisation of armed groups’ violence as a means of regulating conflicts of interest in our country”, he noted. “For, it must be noted that over time, they specialised in the art of monetising peace in exchange for remuneration or positions of power. A vicious circle”, denounced Lambert Mende. For the government spokesperson, “We must put an end to the widely-held belief that the rebellions and violence are the path to a high-flying career within the Congolese armed forces and/or a means to take part in the political process, by avoiding democratic election which is, however, since the declaration of the 2006 Constitution, the only legitimate means to gain power”.[7]


On 21st September, a member of the technical secretariat responsible for the organisation of the consultations declared that the national consultations will continue until September 28th.[8]


On 23rd September, the participants of the national consultations began, within their respective thematic groups, to harmonise the conclusions and recommendations that have been drawn up. They will then present these recommendations to the presidium, before the start of discussions over the course of the talks’ plenary assembly. It is this plenary assembly which will approve all the conclusions and recommendations resulting from all of the thematic groups. The final conclusions will be submitted to the Head of the State in the form of a general progress report.

Evaluating their work, the delegates of the thematic group Governance, democracy and institutional reforms are pleased with the work carried out and the consensus which prevailed during discussions. During assessment of the country’s political situation, however, the participants in this thematic group were divided. Delegates of the opposition deplored the lack of democracy, of successful governance and of the rule of law in DRC. For their part, the representatives of the majority supported the efforts the country has made to address this issue.

The participants of the thematic group ‘Disarmament, demobilisation, social rehabilitation or repatriation’ also confirm that the discussions within their group are moving forward despite the grumblings of some opponents. The latter continue to call for the participation of the armed group representatives, believing that it cannot be claimed that the security problems in the East of the country will be solved without associating the war leaders. This request which has been taken into account by the Presidium has not yet led to a concrete decision. Meanwhile, the participants in this thematic group have begun sharing their recommendations.[9]


On 24th September, the presidium of the national consultations authorised the participation of the representatives of seven former armed groups. This decision was announced at the end of a meeting between the Presidium, the administrator of the national demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration programme (GDR) and an expert of the programme for the stabilisation and rebuilding of conflict zones in the East of the DRC (Starec). The decision of the presidium followed upon the request of the opponents of the thematic group Disarmament, demobilisation, social rehabilitation or repatriation which demanded the participation of the armed groups, because they felt that the issue of insecurity in the East could not be discussed in the absence of armed group representatives. According to the abbot Apollinaire Malumalu, Starec specialist, the representatives of these former armed groups join the national consultations in the capacity of “experts”. “By their experience and their testimony”, he said, “they can provide a number of possible solutions for the eradication of various armed groups and the stabilisation of the whole of the national territory”.

Altogether, seven of the former armed groups that have become political parties following the peace agreement in Goma of 2009 will take part in the work of the thematic group ‘Disarmament, demobilisation, social reintegration or repatriation’. These are the Union of Young Patriots for Solidarity (UJPS), the Alliance of the Popular and Patriotic Forces of Congo (AFPC), the Resistant Patriots of Congo (Pareco), the Coalition of the Resistant Congolese Patriots/The People’s Party (Pareco/PAP), the Union of the Nationalist Democrats (UDN) /Ruwenzori, the Party of Resistant Nationalists (Parensa) and the IRDEC.[10]


On 24th September, the presidium of the national consultations gave the thematic groups a 48 hour deadline to submit their findings to him.[11]


On 26th September, the former Congolese minister of Justice, Mwenze Nkongolo, withdrew from the national consultations. The former colleague of ex-president Laurent Désiré Kabila declared that fundamental problems were not addressed during the talks. The president of the Kabillist Patriots party considered it regrettable that “the amnesty promised by the Head of the State” at the beginning of the national consultations has still not been granted, even though the talks are coming to a close. For Mwenze Kongolo, “this amnesty should be granted to the political prisoners and to people who were badly judged in very difficult situations and who received exaggerated sentences. This is the case for those who were imprisoned during the trial for the assassination of Laurent Désiré Kabila”.[12]


On 26th September, the opposition again suspended its participation in the discussion group ‘Disarmament, demobilisation, social rehabilitation or repatriation’. The opponents again request the participation of the representatives of active armed groups. The regulator of the Forces gained through Change, FAC-Opposition, Lisanga Bonganga, believes that the armed groups that reinvented themselves as political parties at the end of the Agreement of March 23, 2009 can no longer speak on behalf of those armed groups that remain active.[13]


On 26th September, with just two days before the end of the consultations, only two of the five themed groups presented their reports to the presidium. They were the group for ‘Community conflict, peace and reconciliation’, and the group for ‘Decentralisation and the reinforcement of State authority’. The contents of these reports have not been published.[14]





In the corridors of the People’s Palace, the question of “consensual management of the State”, and thus the division of power, has gained followers. According to certain delegates of the civil society, who let slip this information on 25th September, this can be expected following the establishment of a new government which would result from a new majority coalition. It is mainly this subject which divides among the thematic group for governance, where the positions of the three components – majority, opposition and civil society – remain diametrically opposed. For the spokesman of the majority in power, Luzanga Shamandefu, this consensual management, requested by the opposition, according to him, prevents a successful outcome for the national consultations. He confirmed that “the current majority does not find it beneficial to share power with the opposition. It is the opposition that wants and has requested this. If necessary, in the name of political cohesion, we will see what can be arranged,” he said. “At the close of these talks, with our compatriots of the opposition and civil society who can look in the same direction as Kabila, we will see the possibility of increasing the current presidential majority so that there are many more of us ”, he concluded.[15]


According to Zacharie Bababaswe, disagreements persist regarding the division of power. He pointed out that the power-sharing proposal made by the opposition is unrealistic, particularly as there is a majority who won the elections in November 2011. This deputy suggested, in the name of national cohesion, a government of consensus which would include certain members of the opposition to be appointed according to the discretion of the Head of the State, in accordance with the constitution. Another member of the majority accused the members of the opposition of raising the stakes in the general assembly on the basis of their political ambitions.

For their part, several actors of the opposition think that the consensual management of the country has become irreversible, following the incapacity of the leaders of the institutions in place to note the challenge of the survival of the DRC as a nation while bringing an end to the war in the East, by increasing decentralisation of the economy for the social welfare of the community. For Serge Mayamba, the convocation of the national consultations by the head of state is an admission of the current majority in power’s failings.

The proposal of the opposition regarding the consensual management of the Senate as well as provincial Assemblies and basic entities like town halls, municipalities and sectors, which suffer a legitimacy crisis for lack of elections before the constitutional deadline, is at the centre of the controversy in the general assembly of the “Good governance and institutional reform”.[16]


The ideas will be put together with the work of the national consultations, before the plenary must adopt the resolutions of all the thematic groups. Among the ideas that garner an abundance of press coverage is that of the formation of a National union or consensus government founded on the principal of a consensual democracy and a “republican pact”. The Kinshasan newspaper “Prosperity” came across a document, “data sheet – Phase 2”, which appeals for a consensus government.

According to this document, the idea of a consensual democracy is based on the fact that the relative crisis of legitimacy resulting from the electoral debacle of 2011 (dispute of a majority accused of being the result of cheating) requires a species of “republican pact” between the principal political forces of the country. This “Republican Pact” would imply an agreement on a government programme and provisions guaranteeing the stability of the Government (certainly the reshuffle of a parliamentary majority).

This consensual democracy is devoted to inclusion, continuous negotiation and compromise. It has the advantage of making all political forces responsible for the destiny of the country, involving them in making decisions affecting the future of the State. But the principle of consensus does not erase pluralism or the divergence of opinions. It privileges “a great civic and patriotic vision of the nation, subordinating the particular interests of the individuals and groups for the benefit of all”. The consensual democracy is the most effective political model with regard to the realisation of the peace and stability of political institutions, because it forges harmony, the necessary union of conscience and the sense of continuing responsibility of the individual for the nation’s destiny. The success of such a consensual democracy and a government based on the principle of consensus requires a great sense of the State, as well as a culture of political dialogue. Failure to achieve this would risk leading to a few political forces taking the nation hostage or to the maximisation of selfish interests to the detriment of the public interest.

Consensual democracy can be considered, in the case of DR Congo, as a transitional stage towards the organisation of truly transparent, democratic and credible elections, the results of which could not be disputed by the parties involved. These elections would pave the way to a majority democracy.

The prospect of a consensus government was born from the real need to guarantee the survival of the State. Certain constraints, both internal (dilution of national unity), and external (repeated attacks on the national territory), have led to a change in the State’s priorities and logically require a change of attitude and configuration in the dynamics of the governance of the Republic.
The consensus government should consequently be perceived as being an urgent mechanism for the implementation of the strategies devised by the Congolese people through the national consultations, to face the threats which weigh on the destiny of the Republic. This Executive of expression is an interlude that might prove to be, under certain conditions, relatively efficient in the context of this crisis.

This would require the men and women who will be part of this Government, to act with more serenity, responsibility, discipline, diligence and patriotism to get each and every one of them to transcend their personal political ambitions and prioritise the interests of the community and “general well-being”.

As the political game-play has resulted in a waste of energy and has thus proved to be counter-productive and even subversive, the union between the majority and opposition within an institutional framework appears to be the only possible solution for overcoming adversity. The government of consensus would have, in addition, the advantage; with more will, courage and self-sacrifice, to give the Republic a relative political stability which would make it possible to triumph over the dangers that the Republic faces.

By entering into this consensus government, the opposition would of course take a huge risk with regard to its electorate, but productive coexistence is preferable to the polarisation of estranged parties.

It is necessary to bear in mind the “non-fusion” nature of the consensus government: each partner will preserve his or her identity or political motivations, the PPRD will remain the majority party and the MLC, UFDC, parties of the opposition. The Government of consensus is a marriage of circumstance on behalf of the best interests of the nation. After that, each partner will at the proper time be able to freely appeal for the vote of the people.[17]


The end of the national consultations is close. But, the question of a new government, described as national cohesion, remains at the centre of the debate as, in parallel, the question of the 2016 deadline is posed, representing the end of the current mandate. This twofold concern still divides consultation participants, in particular the participants of the thematic group ‘Governance, democracy and institutional reforms’. If it remains that the consensus has been reached on the formation of a new government, based on the new presidential majority composed of participants in the national consultation process, there would still be disagreements with regards to the collateral consequences which could ensue. Hence, we ask: what will happen to the 2016 deadline in the context of the formation of a government resulting from a new majority?

This concern is related to the debate on the renewal or otherwise of the president of the Republic’s mandate and that of other institutions such as the National Assembly and the Senate.

Two tendencies are noticeable. The first comes from those who respect the election deadline of 2016, supposed to put an end to the current mandate of the president of the Republic and the national deputies. The second is supported by those who find that the consensus between politicians is worth more than the texts and the deadlines which result from this. This reasoning is developed by proponents of consensual democracy. According to the latter, “the DRC does not need the limitation of mandates”. They believe that the customs and practices which bring the political class to agreement can take precedence over the texts and other election deadlines. The “consensual” democrats point out that by convening the national consultations, the President of the Republic became aware of the limits of the electoral process. It is a question of the frustrations and dissatisfaction caused by the presidential elections in 2006 and 2011. The lowest of the low, according to them, would be the minimal variation of scores between the candidates for these two polls. In 2006, Joseph Kabila won 58.5% of votes against 41.95% for Jean-Pierre Bemba. In 2011 Joseph Kabila was elected with 48.95% while his challenger, Etienne Tshisekedi received 32.33% of the vote. Proponents of consensual democracy suggest that the failure to take this reality into account had the effect of exhausting national cohesion, which is, however, essential for everyone’s participation in the development of the country.

The solution? To correct the errors of the past. The “consensual” democrats propose and insist that, from now on, the election winners learn how to work with the losers to manage the country.

According to this proposal, the formation of a government of national cohesion – an outstandingly political decision – will impose a new political context. From this point of view, proponents of this theory consider it inappropriate to still attempt to comply with the deadline. In the name of the national cohesion which will establish itself following the national consultations – the remainder materialised by the formation of a new government- it will become imperative to negotiate a new electoral road map. This will, inexorably, break the stranglehold of 2016.[18]


According to some who boycotted the national consultations, these talks were going to be a manoeuvre, which they described as subtle, for the President of the Republic to revise the Constitution, in order to remain in power through a third presidential mandate. And yet, according to other sources, no such thing has even been considered during the consultations. For those who think that these national consultations will lead to the formation of a government of national unity, still according to the latest sources, they are also wide of the mark, because the order of the President of the Republic has been clear about the role of the national consultations. This reassures us that it would not be a question of getting a slice of the pie, as was the case at the time of the Sun City talks in South Africa which were held the day after various rebellions which had been born in the country. The context is very different. This is because such an assumption would violate the Constitution which clearly states that the government which directs the country comes from the parliamentary majority. The President of the Republic cannot go against this constitutional condition.[19]





The South Kivu Civil Society submitted the following agenda to the national consultations:

1st Theme: Peace, Security and Reinforcement of State authority

1st Subtopic: Peace and Security


– Presence of domestic and foreign armed groups on Congolese soil;

– Failure of the process to integrate the armed groups into the National Army (Intrusion of foreigners and criminals within the FARDC…);

– Illegal circulation of light weapons and small arms.

– Failure of the various military operations carried out jointly by the FADRC, Rwanda Defence Forces and the MONUSCO (Umoja Wetu, Kimya 1, Kimya 2, Amani leo, Amani kamilifu…) in order to track the armed groups including the FDLR;

– Expansionist inclinations of neighbouring countries expressed through recurrent attacks and interference in the DRC’s domestic affairs;

– Politicisation and tribalisation of the recruitment process for posts and ranks within the security services. The consequences of which being the practice of nepotism and corruption in order to obtain favours;

– Areas of the DRC managed by neighbouring countries (as is the case of the strait of Gatumba where it is the Burundian government which in effect manages it).


– To reconsider and accelerate the reform of the security sector (inventory of all the elements of the PNC and FARDC; permutation of the soldiers and police officers who have become traditional leaders; the recycling, consecutively and not simultaneously, of all the elements over a minimum of 4 months; concession of the ranks and functions to the most deserving according to objective and non-political criteria; dismissal of criminals and their surrendering before the Court; well coordinated retreat);

– To neutralise and repatriate the foreign dissenting forces;

– To put in place effective mechanisms for the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of elements of local armed groups (to gather those concerned for rehabilitation and to ensure they are dealt with honourably, to demobilise and reintegrate them back into civilian life in a dignified manner, to track and remove those who refuse to cooperate with this approach…);

– To mentor, equip and motivate the soldiers and the police officers, in such a way that they can honourably step down from their missions;

– To seek out all foreigners and presumed criminals within the army, PNC and other security services and to present them before the relevant jurisdictions.

– To renounce agreements which do not meet the fundamental interests of national security.

– To settle the legal dispute regarding those areas of the DRC managed by the neighbouring countries, with a view to total control of national territory.

2nd Subtopic: Peace, Safety and Reinforcement of the authority of the State


– Several areas of the National territory are outside the control of the Government and are currently administered by dissenting forces (the national and foreign armed groups);

– Infiltration of security services: PNC, ANR, the army,…

– Several civil authorities in the territories (Administrators of the territories and Governors) are intimidated by the soldiers and other persons in charge of the security services;

– Dysfunction of the legal apparatus and the existing jurisdictions.


– To put an end to the national armed groups by an approach of auto-demobilisation or rehabilitation and to end the foreign armed groups through a diplomatic and military approach;

– Reorganisation of the security services;

– That the military power is subordinated to civil power (to sanction all the soldiers who do not comply, to ensure the regular turnover, every three years, of soldiers and other members of the security services…);

– To bring forward the hearing of those due to be tried (Making operational the Courts of peace and creating secondary seats of the high courts in the large, remote urban areas).

2nd theme: Governance, Democracy, Decentralisation and Institutional Reforms


– Absence of the State authority throughout the Republic;

– Non-completion of the election cycle by the non-organisation of local, municipal, provincial and Senate elections;

– Absence of justice;

– Lack of traceability in the management of revenue and expenditure;

– Tendency towards the revision or the destruction of the constitution, to perpetually prevent power changing hands;

– Problems related to the definition of the entities affected by the divisions;

– Issue of surrender of revenue and taxation at the source;

– Slow pace of the Government in the reform of the army and the police and security service (DGM, ANR,…).


– Establish the authority of the State throughout the National territory;

– To complete before January 2015 the electoral cycle (to organise the provincial, municipal and local elections at the same time);

– Justice should no longer be two-tiered (strict for some and lenient for others);

– To adopt a law on transparency in the management of the revenue and public expenditure for the attention of the provincial assemblies and the provincial governors

– To appropriate the campaign known as “Don’t mess with my constitution”;

– To ensure a broad consultation across the concerned entities before adopting the law;

– To make operational the new provinces and Decentralised Territorial Entity

– To work out a realistic calendar for reform of the army, police force and security services.

3rd theme: Economy, Production Sector and Public Finances


– Low fuel consumption interior of domestic production (extraversion of the national economy)

– high consumption of imported products (the tomato, the pilipili, grey cement, sugar, milk and other products which one can produce locally and in great quantity are today imported from nearby countries, because they are less expensive than those produced locally because of over taxation);

– Absence of industry and investment;

– Non-competitive foreign trade;

– Absence of policies for the stimulation of research;

– Lack of adequate infrastructure (to go abroad, the inhabitants of Kivu are required to take flights from Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and even Tanzania and this causes a huge loss of revenue).

– Public expenditure in favour of political staff

– Diversion of State revenue at all levels


– To encourage local production initiatives via tax relief;

– To re-launch local units of production, such as the Sugar refinery of Kivu, the Cement factory of Katana and the dairy of Kivu.

– Promote potentially more profitable sectors (tourism, energy, agriculture and fishing);

– To modernise the airports of Kavumu, of Goma and Kindu, to allow the eastern population to take international flights from national territory

– 40% revenue tax withholding

– To fight against impunity

4th theme: Disarmament, Demobilisation, social Rehabilitation and/or Repatriation of the armed groups


Failure of the process of Disarmament and Demobilisation, political manipulation and unemployment.


Resume the demobilisation process, focusing on the interests of demobilised combatants and ensuring they are monitored; put in place an effective process of disarmament, dismantling arms caches, combat the phenomenon of the recycled and create jobs.

5th theme: Community conflicts, national reconciliation and transitional justice

1st Subtopic: Community conflicts and land conflicts


– Occupation of land and mismanagement of land policy;

– Problem of traditional leadership in the chiefdoms and sectors;

– Militarisation and polarisation of certain communities;

– Identity crisis, stereotypes, prejudices and discrimination regarding access to power;

– Discourse of identity for political ends;

– Land insecurity of the populations (75%) fault of legal cover;

– Monopolisations of the countryside by foreign companies and the urban middle-class.


– To review the land, mining and forester code while harmonising with the traditional authority;

– To demilitarise communities;

– To facilitate access to power (the post of Governor and vice governor) based on objective criteria taking into account identities;

– To discourage political manipulation and support for armed groups;

– Creation of jobs for young people;

– Installation of a singular service for land registry;

2nd Subtopic: National reconciliation and transitional Justice


– Absence of a national policy of reconciliation;

– Failure of the truth and reconciliation commission of the transition;

– Impunity;

– Weakness of the law on the amnesty which is more sector-specific than universal;

– Lack of a national policy of compensation for losses caused to victims.


– To adopt a national policy of reconciliation by the promotion of a national pact of peace and reconciliation;

– To create new a CVR, according to international standards;

– To adopt a law on the implementation of the Rome Statute;

– To put in place a national programme of compensating harm caused to victims.

6th theme: Social, education, health and State civil servant issues


-Parents managing teachers at all levels;

– Defective school infrastructures in the majority of rural areas;

– Proliferation of schools and universities not complying with standards:

– Fraud of school documents and sale of school property in certain schools;

– Delay in the delivery of school and academic qualifications;

– Incompatibility of the school and university syllabus with the labour market;

– Difficult access to health care (deposit payment required before care received, processing fee and hospitality;

– Existence of illegal pharmacies and circulation on the market of out-of-date and unknown drugs;

– Lack of health care providers in rural areas;

– Weak budget allocation for the management of chronic diseases;

– Insignificant salary for State officials and ageing personnel;

– Absence of a policy of recycling of officials of the State;

– Subjective recruitment and politicisation of the administration;

– Lack of life insurance, absence of a national retirement policy and poor management of pensioners by the INSS.


– Abolition of the premium and compliance with article 43 of the constitution which guarantees free education;

– To modernise the delivery of school and academic qualifications;

– Punish fraudsters and recalcitrant school managers;

– Close non-viable educational and academic institutions;

– Recycle the managers of health facilities according to the non-commercial nature of health;

– Develop a national policy of access to health care;

– To build in each province a central purchasing office for pharmaceutical products where pharmacies can stock up at an affordable price;

– Bring to justice all those who manufacture or market counterfeit pharmaceutical products.[20]

[1] CF Radio Okapi, 13.09’13

[2] Cf Radio Okapi, 22.09.’13; Le Phare – Kinshasa, 24.09.’13

[3] CF Radio Okapi, 13.09’13

[4] Cf Bertin Kangamotema – Potential – Kinshasa, 14.09. ‘ 13

[5] CF Radio Okapi, 13.09’13

[6] CF Radio Okapi, 13.09’13

[7] FC Poteniel – Kinshasa’ 19.0913

[8] CF Radio Okapi, 13.09’13

[9] CF Radio Okapi, 13.09’13

[10] CF Radio Okapi, 13.09’13

[11] CF Radio Okapi, 13.09’13

[12] CF Radio Okapi, 13.09’13

[13] CF Radio Okapi, 13.09’13

[14] CF Radio Okapi, 13.09’13

[15] CF Radio Okapi, 13.09’13

[16] Cf Eric Wemba – the Headlight – Kinshasa, 26.09. ‘ 13

[18] FC Poteniel – Kinshasa’ 19.0913

[19] Cf Future – Kinshasa, 30.09. ‘ 13

[20] cf Prosperity – Kinshasa, 23.09. ‘ 13


Translation carried out thanks to the PerMondo initiative and the voluntary translator Katie Gibson. PerMondo helps non-profit associations with free translations. Created by Mondo Agit.