SUMMARY:

MAIN ARTICLE: So what do we do now?

1. INTERNAL POLICY

a. The National Assembly has elected a definitive cabinet

b. Matata Ponyo, the newly appointed Prime Minister

c. The Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS)

2. TWO EVALUATION WORKSHOPS FROM THE FIRST PHASE OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

a. The Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI)

b. AETA (Strive for accessible and peaceful elections)

3. THE CIVIL SOCIETY WORRIES ABOUT STATE SECURITY

 

MAIN ARTICLE: SO WHAT DO WE DO NOW?

 

The Current Situation.

The National Assembly has elected its definitive cabinet and the President of the Republic has appointed a new Prime Minister responsible for creating the new government. It appears as though everything is unfolding almost as if the elections of the 28th November had been “free, democratic, clear and fair”. Even the majority of the members of the Opposition no longer dare question the electoral results that have been published, having now accepted that they too form part of the system, in order to “lead their fight within the new institutions, on behalf of the people that elected them”. That said, the opposition’s most extreme members still maintain the victory their candidate achieved, despite being unable to provide the “true results” gathered from every polling station, at a national level. In fact, the reality is that the “true electoral results” are still unknown. In this situation, the logical thing to do would have been to declare both the Presidential and the Legislative elections void, and have votes cast again, although for political and economical reasons, as well a time constraints, this wasn’t done.

The Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) has just brought the Legislative and Presidential elections to a close, by way of an evaluation meeting. This was done after national, and foreign, electoral spectators refuted claims of consistent foul play, including electoral fraud, and openly accused the published results of “not being credible”, which resulted in the CENI being expected to produce a clear and convincing argument regarding the different issues, such as: electoral lists containing double votes; the votes of minors, members of the military as well as of non-nationals; the circulation of pre-ticked ballot boxes; the miscounting of votes, etc.

It was thought that, after such foul play being brought to light, the Electoral Commission would have published amended results; this never materialised. In an opening speech, after having listed the obvious “problems” found in every aspect of the election process, the President of the Electoral Commission reiterated numerous times, without batting so much as an eyelid, that “the results that were announced are not only fair but also credible. None of these issues have affected the ballot box results”. In his closing speech, he then went on to make a series of vague “promises” in response to the proposals put forward by the spectators.

Currently, there is still a great deal of unrest regarding the political situation and, as a consequence, the way in which the country is governed may well be affected. Examples of areas that may be affected include the living conditions which may cease to improve, and which may ultimately result in the total collapse of the country.

For these reasons, it is essential to try and find a way out of the current situation, away from the plotting and hierocracy, as well as from the latest elections which gave the country a new President and a new National Assembly, despite their legitimacy being somewhat questionable, if not openly rejected by many. The different proposals put forward by the spectators, the Société civile (Civil Society) and the political class, who make up a large percentage of the opposition, are now giving the impression of no longer calling the new institutions’ issues from the latest elections into question, even if they were they were heavily scrutinised.

So what do we do now?

What could be done now is continue the election process, whilst organising the election of the provincial candidates, who will then be responsible for electing the future members of the Senate, followed by organising the municipal and local elections, whilst taking as many measures as possible to prevent the same negative publicity that had come from the previous elections. In order to achieve this, the electoral observers unanimously decided to request the reconstruction and reshuffling of the Electoral Commission. Additionally, there are members of the Société civile that are calling for the resignation of some members of the CENI, as they have been revealed to be the ones responsible for the previous election’s setbacks. This, it could be argued, is a price worth paying if it means that in the future an effective and credible Electoral Commission, where people can and will accept that they are not irreplaceable if the confidence of the Congolese people can be regained, can be obtained.

 

1. INTERNAL POLICY

 

a. The National Assembly has elected a definitive cabinet

 

On the 7th April, at the Hotel Memling of Kinshasa a presentation was attended for the new parliamentary group, Terre d’Avenir (TA), within the National Assembly. Their members are essentially from political parties members of the Majorite Presidentielle (MP). The objectives pursued by the TA are, amongst others, the promotion of democracy, human and environmental rights and support towards the head of states vision. The structure of the TA is very simple: it consists of the plenary, its vital organ, of a presidential office, a vice-president, a second vice-president, a reporter, a assistant reporter, an parliamentary administrator and an assistant parliamentary administrator. After meetings, the UDCO Baudouin Banza was designated president, the CCU Lambert Mende first vice-president, the PA Tryphon Kin-kiey second vice-president, the ULDC Zacharie Babaswe reporter, the RDPR Tibasima assistant reporter, the CNC Pius Muabilu parliamentary administrator, and finally, the PANU Charly Wenga, assitant parliamentary administrator.

Fifteen candidates were chosen for seven posts on the definitive cabinet of the National Assembly.

– Presidency (Presidential Majority): Aubin Minaku Ndjalandjoko from the Parti du peuple pour la reconstruction et la démocratie (PPRD- Party for people for reconstruction and democracy);

– First vice-president (Presidential Majority): Toussaint Ekombe Mpetshi, from Parti des démocrates chrétiens (PDC- the Democratic Christian Party) and Charles Mwando Nsimba, from the Union des nationalistes fédéralistes (UNADEF – Union of nationalist federalists);

– Second vice-president (Opposition): Samy Badibanga Ntita, Timothée Kombo Nkinsi and André Paluku Kavula, all from the Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social (UDPS- Union for democracy and social progress); Anzuluni Bembe (independent candidate);

– Reporter (Presidential Majority): Norbert Ezadri Egumu from the Mouvement social pour la rénovation (MSR – Social movement for Renovation);

– Assistant reporter (Opposition): Angélique Milemba, Françoise Bemba Ndokwa and Yvon Dangbele Ngotuga from the Mouvement de libération du Congo (MLC- the Liberation Movement of Congo), Jean Pierre Tshimanga from the CAC/ADR, Marie Thérèse Basiala Maka from the UFC;

– Parliamentary administrator (Presidential Majority): Elysée Minembwe from the Alliance pour la renovation du Congo (ARC – Alliance for the renovation of Congo);

– Assitant parliamentary administrator (Presidential Majority): Bosco Kaboyi Bwivu from the AFDC.

 

11th April, the oppositions MPs threaten to not participate in the final cabinet elections of the National Assembly. The oppositions parliamentary groups accuses those from the Majorité Présidentielle of using strategies for the election of the MPs Kombo Nkisi from the UDPS and Tshimanga Bwana from the ADR to the position of 2nd vice-president and assistant reporter against their will.

The MPs from the UDPS who sit at the National Assembly support Samy Badibanga candidature to the position of 2nd vice-president. According to the results of the primary elections held internally by the parliamentary group UDPS, Samy Badibanga Ntita had swept Timothée Kombo Nkisi away by 18 votes to 8 and 3 to Rémy Massamba.

As for the assistant reporter position, le Mouvement de Libération du Congo thinks it is entitled to it, as the second opposition party. The UDPS and the MLC are, in effect, the two best represented political parties of the opposition in the lower house of Parliament.

 

It raises the question on claims concerning the Head of States political family: Could it be that their openness to the opposition is purely nominal, for externial consummerism?

 

12th April, the MPs have elected the definitive cabinet of the National Assembly:

• President: Aubin Minaku (PPRD), with 343 votes over 349,
• 1st vice-president: Charles Mwando Nsimba (UNADEF), with 324 votes over 349
• 2nd vice-president: Timothée Kombo Nkisi (UDPS), with 312 votes over 349
• 1st reporter: Norbert Ezadri (MSR), with 344 votes over 349
• Assistant reporter: Jean Pierre Tshimanga Bwana (CAC/ADR), with 290 votes over 349
• Parliamentary administrator : Elysée Munembwe (ARC), with 344 votes over 349
• Parliamentary administrators assistant: Jean Bosco Kaboy (AFDC), with 328 votes over 349

 

The election of the members of the definitive cabinet of the National Assembly took place in the absence of a large portion of the opposition party’s MPs, notably those from the UDPS and the MLC. They have boycotted the planery accusing the majority of using tricks to take over the positions of 2nd vice-president and assistant reporter reserved for the opposition, leading figures favoured the majority.

The UDPS had nominated another candidate to occupy the position of second vice – president and the Mouvement de libération du Congo (MLC) had nominated their candidate for that of assistant reporter, but that was finally given to another opposition party.

The new assembly outcome from the Noember 28th 2011 elections is dominated by the Majorité présidentielle (MP), with 340 MPs coming from 60% of the parties, the first being the Parti du peuple pour la reconstruction et la démocratie (PPRD, 61 députés). The opposition has about 120 seats. After the election of the new president of the National Assembly, the President Kabila should now appoint a new Prime Minister soon.

 

The difinitive cabinet of the National Assembly sold out. What can be said about these elections? Everything happened as the Majorité au Parlement forsaw. It’s a party that is always one step ahead of the game; a party where the actors and winner are known well before the kickoff is launched. Everything was done to obey the line drawn by the Majority. With over 342 MPs, the Majority is convinced of having the National Assembly under its control. The big lesson is we now know how that will work with the new lower house of Parliament. Between 2006 and 2011, the National Assembly remains subsurvient to the logic of the Magority. It’s her that dictates the rules of the game.

 

b. Matata Ponyo, the recently appointed Prime Minister

 

On the 18th April, the President, Joseph Kabila, appointed Augustin Matata Ponyo Mapon as Prime Minister.

Born on the 5th June 1964 in Kindu (Maniema), he specialised in monetary and budgetary politics and, upon joining the second Muzito government, became Finance Minister on the 19th February 2010, a post he was re-elected for on the 11th September 2011. Between 2003 and 2010, he was General Director for the main co-ordination office for the Central Bank, after having presided over the leading Comity for the same branch between the years 2001 and 2003. What’s more, Matata Ponyo has also worked as an assistant at the School of Economic Sciences at the University of Kinshasa (Unikin), teaching seminars about International Monetary Economy to final year students.

He also has a fearsome reputation in administration.

Training financial economist, Matata Ponyo is no stranger to both the World Bank and FML. As can be clearly seen from all the above, he doesn’t have the typical profile of a politician. Despite being known for being a member of the PPRD (the Presidential Party), he is particularly famous for being a technocrat. The actions of his government, as he states in a press conference, are going to be based on “fundamental values” which focus largely on: a) resolving social unrest, b) State security, c) improving the way of life for the Congolese people, d) improving economic governance. The formation of the government should be based on competence and the way in which the State plans to manage public affairs. The main political players, as much the Majorité Présidentielle as the Opposition, have all welcomed Matata Ponyo’s appointment, as they recall his, difficult, decision to make politics more accessible to the Congolese people.

 

c. The Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS)

 

On the 10th April, thirty-three candidates belonging to Etienne Tshisekedi’s The Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) were removed from the party. The party’s general intermediary secretary, Raymond Kahungu, has announced that these candidates had no desire to follow the instructions that forbade them to operate from Parliament’s lower chamber, and has asked that the press stop from referring to them as though they were still part of the party from here-on-out. Sources indicate that should they desire to return, they must submit their wishes in writing to the head of the UPDS. The same sources have further indicated that only eight of forty-one candidates that have been elected have expressed their refusal to attend the National Assembly.

Below are the names of those that have been removed from the party:

 

* Mr. PALUKU KAVULA BWANAMBULA ANDRE Kinshasa I Lukunga

* Mr. TSHIBALA NSENGA GUYLAIN Kinshasa II Funa

* Mr. BADIBANGA NTITA SAMY Kinshasa III MtAmba

* Mr. MASAMBA MA-KIESE REMY Kinshasa III MtAmba

* Mr. MAYAMBA MASSAKA SERGE Kinshasa IV Tshangu

* Mr. MAKWALA MA MAVAMBU YE BEDA JEROME Lower-Congo Luozi

* Mr. KOMBO NKISI TIMOTHEE Lower-Congo Madimba

* Mr. NZAU VOLA JOSE Lower-Congo Matadi

* Mr. MBUELA YIMBU EMMANUEL Lower-Congo Moanda

* Mr. NSUKA AIME RODRIGUE Bandundu Bagata

* Mr. NIANGO IZIAMAY MUNSHEMVULA PAPY Bandundu Ville

* Mr. AMBATOBE NYONGOLO AMY South-Kivu Fizi

* Mr. KOLELA YAHANU JOHN Katanga Likasi

* Mr. MULONGO NZEMBA COCO JACQUES Katanga Lubumbashi

* Mr. MUTOMB KAN KATO FABIEN Katanga Lubumbashi

* Mr. MBUYI MAMBA KALALA VASCO Eastern Kasai Kamiji

* Mr. MWAMBA MULANGU BENJAMIN Eastern Kasai Luilu

* Mr. MUSENGA WA MUKUNA BENOIT Eastern Kasai Lupatapata

* Mr. MUTANDA NGOY MUANA ALEXIS Eastern Kasai Mbuji-Mayi

* Mr. KALONJI MUKENDI ROMAIN Eastern Kasai Miabi

* Mr. KABOMBO MUADIANVITA GUY Eastern Kasai Mwene-Ditu

* Mr. NGOYI SHABITANDA ROGER CLEMENT Eastern Kasai Mwene-Ditu

* Mr. TSHIBUMBA KANYANGA Eastern Kasai Ngandajika

* Mme NGOYA KANDA GISELE Eastern Kasai Tshilenge

* Mr. KABUYA MULAMBA KABITANGA MARTIN Western Kasai Dibaya

* Mr. MUKUNA KALAMBAYI DAMIS Western Kasai Dimbelenge

* Mr. KALAMBA MULUMBA N’GALULA JEAN PIERRE Western Kasai Kananga

* Mr. MUYAYA TSHIBONA CONSTATIN Western Kasai Kananga

* Mr. MUBIKAYI MUBALAMATE LEON Western Kasai Luebo

* Mr. MASUASUA BAKATUSH1PA CORNEILLE Western Kasai Luiza

* Mr. KOTA PIEM STEPHANE Western Kasai Mweka

* Mr. NZAJI KABULEKEDI BENOIT Western Kasai Tshikapa

* Mr. TSHIONGO MPUTU DIBINGA BARTHELEMY Western Kasai Tshikapa

 

On the 16th April, in the Kinshasa restaurant’s Green Garden, a number of members of the Opposition have announced the imminent launch of the new platform, named the “Majorité Présidentielle Populaire” (MPP – the Popular Presidential Majority). Eugène Diomi Ndongala, the spokesperson for this newly formed platform, spoke about Etienne Tshisekedi, political parties such as the The Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS), Démocratie chrétienne (Christian Democracy) and Dr Kabamba Mbwebwe (G14), affiliations of the Civil Society traditional powers and youth associations. The idea came from Diomi, after having put it to President Tshisekedi for his consideration.

The objective of this platform is to revive the pressures, internal and external, exerted on the CENI and the pouvoir en place pour le rétablissement de la vérité des urnes étouffée outside the elections on the 28 November 2011. During the press conference, Eugène Diomi Ndongala stated that this new political organisation aimed to “restore truth to the ballot box in RDC so that the Conoglese people can truly be governed by the party that they want, as well as to support actions aimed at conquering the imperium for his excellence Etienne Tshisekedi, Preseident of the RDC, and to form a coalition for the nation in order to bring about a new local and national political leadership that is capable of channelling and allowing the want for change the people have as regards to the political power of the RDC.”

 

The new platform spokesperson also announced that all the electoral platforms “that have used the Tshisekedi label to be elected are not recognised affiliations of the Etienne Tshisekedi political family”, and invited them to accept the consequences of “their immoral actions” without apportioning blame elsewhere. According to the spokesperson, the old affiliations that opted for the current Parliament will be welcomed back, on the condition that they no long sit at the benches of the National French Assembly.

Eugène Diomi has reassured that “the MPP will not boycott” either the provincial or local elections, but emphasises the reshuffling the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI). Once reshuffled, this Commission will start first of all by reorganising the legislatives so that the Congolese have a National Assembly that can truly represent the people.

 

2. TWO EVALUATION WORKSHOPS FROM THE FIRST PHASE OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

 

a. The Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI)

 

On the 10th April, an initiative within the CENI, a workshop for self-evaluation, for the first phase of the electoral process in 2011, opened in Kinshasa. This institution supports, with the participation of its partners, making some aspects of the electoral process more democratic, such as:

Signing up to a party, the electoral register, preventing pre and post electoral violence, electoral campaigns, the giving out of electoral information packs, the publishing of results, finances, how funds are used, etc.

The President of the CENI organisation, Daniel Ngoy Mulunda, delivered an opening speech in which he mentioned the following:

“The double elections on the 28th November, 2011, are a greatly discussed topic, especially after the announcement of the provisional results, and which has been subject to huge amounts of criticism and attacks that continue to come from all sides. In order to obtain the opinions of all those opposed to the process, we have decided to find a time when we will be able to listen to each other and exchange ideas sincerely and in a mutually respectful way. The aim of these exchanges of ideas is not to point the finger and say who is right or wrong, but rather to improve the work of the CENI. The CENI has arranged a mid-term evaluation that will show no complacency towards our electoral process but will, at the same time, have an effect on both the members of the société civile and the other political parties involved. In deciding to organise this workshop, the CENI hoped to create a space for free expression where everyone is truly concerned about the running of the electoral process. This refers especially to the partners, the government, political parties, and affiliations of the Civil Society, amongst others, which can detect and identify all the major problems that have sullied the elections of November 28th, 2011. It aims to put forward solutions to the problems, with the ultimate objective of improving the organisation by the fast approaching due date. All of this will be done in a mutually open and courteous manner; listening to each other is the main thing that is hoped to characterise this workshop. This evaluation isn’t going to be a grilling for the CENI, whereby it would be accused and judged. Anyone coming who is under that impression has been simply misinformed of our intentions. The main objective of the workshop is to allow the CENI, whilst concentrating on the international electoral assistance and all the parties present, to look at all the measures that have already been taken in the 2011-2013 electoral process, so that the managing of the next ones can be improved.

We hope to clearly identify the difficulties encountered, confront the known problems and their origins, and put forward solutions to better face up to any of the same that may arise in the next elections. The questions we are going to have to ask ourselves are those that may help us to understand the cause of these problems: are these problems consistent? Are we going along with the wishes of the members of the CENI, or with those of its affiliations? Have we planned for such problems in the future, and how have we come to be in the situation we are in at the moment? What socio-political context are the elections organised and taking place in? What input has the CENI had? Was leaving the CENI to organise the elections done in good faith? Has the CENI gained any financial advantage from these elections and, if so, under what conditions did it gain them?

Below is the list of problems that we have managed to identify, and that we have submitted to those who are going to be taking part, so that they may analyse them and be able to come up with solutions so that such problems can be avoided in future elections.

• The chaotic handling of the voters.
• Poor positioning of the voting booths.
• Late publicity of the electoral lists.
• High numbers of blanks on the electoral lists.
• The ridiculous price of transport.
• Lack of respect for the law.
• The disorder within the CLCR.
• Large numbers of ballot papers coming from elderly voters.
• Not all witnesses were informed of the results.
• The mention of important people who were not taking part.
• The delay in handing out election information.
• Ballot papers running out half way through the day.
• Ballot papers being lost.
• Destruction of voting booths.
• Attacks and violence on CENI staff.
• Security of sensitive material.
• Neither headmasters of schools used as polling stations or people of authority being present when the votes were being counted.
• Training, or lack thereof, for electoral staff.
• Hostility from some parties.
• Poor communication with, and complete absence of, the société civile and the media.
• Withholding payment for the electoral staff and police
• Lack of civic and electoral civility.

This list is by no means exhaustive, and so we would encourage you to raise all the issues you have come across, and add them to the list, so that we may be able to find solutions to them. What’s more, in spite of all these inadequacies, we acknowledge that the announced results are not only fair but also credible. None of the previously talked about issues have played a part in the results taken from the two elections.”

For next time, the five following commissions have been put forward:

– Commission 1: Legal, financial, administrative and budgetary

– Commission 2: Logistic, security and filing

– Commission 3: Recruitment, training, and improved

– Commission 4: Electoral operations and dealing with the facts

– Commission 5: Management and relationships with those who have an invested interest.

 

Minister Daniel Ngoy Mulunda, president of the CENI organisation, and his associates without doubt expected an automatic ratification of their working relationship, before proceeding with the following stages, the organisation of provincial and local elections.

Alas, after the official opening speeches, Wednesday the 11th of April was a cold shower for the staff of this democracy-supporting institution. The silent partners of the CENI, including the European Union at the head, have presented as a precondition to their participation in financing future stages of the electoral process, a general audit of electoral and financial transactions. CENI’s partners require clear responses to the concerns raised in the reports of electoral observation missions, both nationally and internationally. They are convinced that the Congolese people were victims of an electoral hold up that absolutely calls for reparation. CENI must justify in concrete terms the opacity of the electoral register, the enrolment of under-age children, soldiers and policemen, the inaccessibility of the server, the duplicates, the late publication of electoral lists and mapping of polling stations, the late transportation of electoral kits and ballot papers, the parallel ballot papers in free circulation before the elections, the ballot papers checked off outside the polling station, the absence of the minutes from the results, the compilation of results in towns and regions having recorded losses of electoral packages (in the case of Kinshasa and Mbuji-Mayi).

All the partners (the European Union, British Cooperation, western and American governments) having participated in financing the elections see through the use of funds. In this regard, the CENI and the PACE/Pnud (Project to support electoral cycles) are particularly singled out. They are obliged to enlighten everyone on the nature of the expenses incurred in the technical and material organisation of the elections.

The financial audit proves to also be incontrovertible. Failing this, the valves will remain tightly closed. Ngo Muluna and his team are called to justify themselves in regards to allegations of embezzlement of funds that circulate around their management.

Immediately after the workshop of self-evaluation, it was discovered that the bulk of results distributed by the CENI would have been the work of a compiling task of a PNUD expert, who would not have based his findings on any foundation. In fact, the minutes that should have accompanied the results should have been seriously lacking.

Consequently, the partners require that before resuming the other phases of the electoral process, the current staff of the CENI give in their notice and that this institution that supports democracy be completely restructured. In their opinion, a new authority to organise elections, piloted by honest, competent and effective independent key figure, should take the place of CENI so that the next elections are really free, transparent, democratic and peaceful.

 

In what amounts to a process of re-legitimisation, CENI could not count on the UNC of Vital Kamerhe who declined his invitation in a later addressed to CENI, dated 10th April. For the UNC, it is more than astonishing that CENI, cornered from all sides with a petition circulating about the resignation of its office, turns now towards the opposition that it has despised throughout rhe electoral process. Having succeeded in its crime, with the “re-election” of Joseph Kabila as the head of the DR Congo with a more than comfortable majority in the National Assembly, CENI wants to re-legitimise itself with this false evaluation to pursue the electoral process (provincial, municipal and local elections). CENI is judge and jury and its president, wanting to warn critics, has declared that this evaluation is not a tribunal. For the UNC faithful to its plan to end the crisis, the question of the evaluation and the management of the electoral process should be part of an overall mechanism that must be addressed during a dialogue between politicians and Civil Society. While recognising CENI’s right to self evaluate, the UNC awaits the general debate between the majority, the opposition and Civil Society with the implication of the international community to evaluate the electoral process. It is at this price and this price alone that the CENI institution will be legitimate again, which is far from being the case at the moment, as it is hated, because it is considered as an appendage of power. Having lost all legitimacy and all credibility, even within the presidential majority, CENI will render a great service to the nation by simply resigning; dignity obliges it. Above all since certain members are implicated in corruption affairs and illegal enrichments.

 

On the 19th of April, CENI’s president, Daniel Ngoy Mulunda closed the evaluation workshop at midterm of CENI’s activities. If we believe the president of the CENI: the time factor was the first enemy of the electoral process being obliged, to avoid the institutional vacuum at the top of the state, to organise elections within the very constricted time of 7 months, in which several parameters of transparency and fair election just have not been taken into account. And, to carry on: “this evaluation workshop has allowed us to lay new bases to better understand the future but by taking into consideration the weaknesses of the past process”. Ngoy Mulunda on behalf of the CENI Board has pledged to translate all recommendations formulated during this evaluation workshop into decisions and to ensure their implementation.

– Regarding the high number of omitted voters, the workshop recommended to set foot on, in terms of antennas and the Centre of National Treatment (CNT), integration mechanisms of voters with cards, whose names are not on the lists posted outside polling an counting stations.

– With regards to the weaknesses note in the mapping of polling stations and the BVD, the workshop recommends updating them.

– Regarding the question of the electoral register, it has been recommended to the CENI management to resume, in the shortest time, dialogue with politicians.

– Regarding the candidates registration, in the future it will scrupulously respect the term of the electoral law and the conditions of eligibility to avoid a high number of candidates.

– Concerning the default of parameter control for development, implementation, management of the budget, it is recommended to the government to dispense funds assigned to electoral transactions in time, to pay all debts vis-à-vis suppliers and to the management, to from now on control all parameters and elements which involve the development of the electoral process to ensure proper implementation.

– The commands and acquisitions of electoral material constituted one of the weaknesses in the past process. The procedure of public procurement will be scrupulously respected in the next elections. Similarly we must give a reasonable time between the commands and the deployment of material towards the hubs, under hubs.

– Concerning the management of results in terms of CLCR, it is heavily recommended that society stakeholders can, in the future, be integrated not as observers but as fully fledged electoral agents, to reinforce transparency and the credibility of future ballots.

– The calendar for provincial elections scheduled for late January 2013, will be develop with emphasis on technical and operational requirements and not political requirements like in 2011 but, in close consultation with politicians, the government, the silent partners of exterior funs as well as the technical international assistance of MONUSCO and the PNU/PACE project.

 

b. AETA (Strive for accessible and peaceful elections)

 

After a national workshop organised from the 16th to the 18th in Kinshasa, on the evaluation od the electoral process, the NGO of the Regrouped Civil Society, within the AETA (Strive for accessible and peaceful elections) recommended, among other things, the holding of political dialogue between key implicate figures and the restructuration of CENI, as an exit route from the post electoral crisis.

In his summary of provincial evaluation of the electoral process, the permanent secretary of the AETA, Jérôme Bonso, singled out two observations. The first is the technical and logistic shortcomings of the November 2011 elections. The shortcomings that according to him, are inherent in the lack of time and the constraining calendar of the process. While the second observation is related to the ethics of the deeds and the actions presented by the CENI’s key figures and the credibility of the electoral process and have seriously “undermined the credibility and the transparency of the elections”. For Jérôme Bonso, these two observations linked to the process “require a profound and imminent reform of the CENI and the reinstallation of the credibility of the electoral process through a rational electoral calendar taking in to consideration all the different elections before assisting the true participatory democracy”.

It is why it proposes, amongst other possible solutions, the organisation of political dialogue for cooperation between key implicated figures; the profound reconstruction of CENI, and its conception as a civil institution or bipolarised political institutions and its composition.

Regarding the reconstruction of CENI, the participants recommend an external audit for CENI and PNUD/PACE. They have also recommended organising the external evaluation of CENI; auditing the electoral register for the credibility and transparency of the process, instituting a plenary as the decision-making body, orientation and evaluation of CENI, instituting the board as the body of management and enforcement of decisions…

Regarding the composition of the board, it should include representatives of Civil Society (70%) and political parties (30%). In regards to the plenary, it should be composed of 22 people representing all the provinces of DR Congo.

Speaking of a way out of the crisis, AETA propose the organisation of political dialogue reduced in size and within a short period of time between the key figures implicated in the crisis. This meeting will include the President of the Republic and the Majority; the principal leaders of the opposition, the Civil Society and the international community.

 

 

3. THE CIVIL SOCIETY WORRIES ABOUT STATE SECURITY

 

From the 9th to the 13th of April, Members of the Network for Security Sector Reform and Justice (RRSSJ) were reunited at the Lassalien Centre of Kintambo, in the city of Kinshasa, to analyse the prevalent security situation in all the provinces of the DR Congo in general, and in the East in particular.

The network paints a grim picture: there are military, police and administrative annoyances throughout the entire national territory; the resurgence of national and foreign armed groups, particular in the East of the country; the existence of parallel commands within certain military regions in provinces; the desertion within the Armed Forces, with the movements from general Bosco Ntahanda, from the former national council for the defence of the people (CNDP) of the deposed Laurent Nkunda. The RRSSJ also notes the massive acts of sexual violence against women and young girls by uncontrolled armed men; acts of aggression that are almost systematic of the defenders of human rights, private media outlets and journalists.

To this, we must add security crises which occured before, during and after the presidential and legislative election of November 2011, the abusive use of national police for personal motives, the recourse to “Pomba or strong men” to maintain public order, instead of national police. In addition to this, he condemns the often disparaged phenomena, throughout national territory, of embezzlement of sales committed by agents from the national Congolese police, soldiers and other people from state security; the resurgence of urban criminality with the “Kuluna” phenomena in Kinshasa, “Shégués” in other provinces, “Maï Bobo” in the North-Kirvu and South Kirvu, “the Suicidals” in Kasaï Oriental, etc., the deterioration of socio-economic fibre.

Faced with this deplorable situation, the members of the Network for Security Sector Reform and Justice recommend the following:

– To the President of the Republic, to re-establish the authority of the state throughout national territory, to take urgent and realistic measures to put an end to activism among foreign and national armed groups, to take urgent measures to accelerate the process of reform within the army, the national police, the state services of security and justice, in order to guarantee peace and national security.

– To the government, to: watch over the security of the population that has fallen victim to the atrocities committed by agents from the national Congolese police, the Congolese armed forces and the national agency of intelligence; to take coercive measures against foreign and national armed groups, to take security measures to fight against urban crime.

To the Parliament, to: propose, vote and adopt all laws relating to the reform of the army, the national police, the services of security and justice.

– To the Judiciary, to: fight at all levels against impunity of key figures in cases of insecurity, by presenting the law independently.

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Both translators Will Masters and Emily Jarrin-Leon have helped us to translate this document from French into English. This free translation project was arranged by the initiative PerMondo and the translation agency Mondo Agit

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